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Secondary Liability for Federal Trust Fund Taxes 
By Steve Johnson 
When collection of unpaid taxes 
cannot be effected from the person 
primarily liable for them, the Internal 
Revenue Code creates for the IRS a 
number of mechanisms for collection from 
secondary parties. To satisfy the 
requirements of fairness and due process, 
secondary liability is imposed only when 
the party has some nexus to the liability, 
that is, when that person's actions helped 
create the liability or frustrated its 
collection from the primary taxpayer. 
This article discusses l.R.C. § 6672, 
one of the most widely used and important 
of the secondary liability mechanisms in 
tax. There are numerous § 66 72 
assessments each year. Attorneys 
representing small business and their 
owners can expect to have some clients 
who have § 6672 problems. 
CONTEXT 
Employers are required to deduct from 
wages paid to an employee both 
withholding as prepayment of income tax 
and the employee's share of FICA (Social 
Security) tax.! These are called "trust fund 
taxes" because each is deemed to be a 
"special fund in trust for the United 
States."z Employers are supposed to pay 
them over to the IRS. Unfortunately, 
more than a few employers don't. 
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Of course, the IRS can proceed 
against the delinquent employer, but this 
typically is unavailing -- the very reason 
that the trust fund taxes aren't paid is that 
the business is in financial trouble. Thus, 
the IRS needs remedies against potentially 
solvent secondary parties connected with 
the underpayment. Section 6672 is the 
most frequently asserted such remedy.3 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
The § 6672 mechanism is variously 
known as the Trust Fund Recovery Tax (or 
Penalty), the 100% Penalty, or the 
Responsible Person (or Officer) Penalty. 
Section 6672(a) provides: "Any person 
required to collect, truthfully account for, 
and pay over any tax ... who willfully fails 
to [do so] shall, in addition to other 
penalties provided by law, be liable for a 
penalty equal to the total amount of the 
tax." There are two principal substantive 
issues in § 6672 cases: (1) capacity 
(whether the target is a person under the 
collection or payment obligation) and (2) 
willfulness (whether that person acted 
willfully in not meeting that obligation). 
Capacity: "Person," for this purpose, 
includes a corporate officer, a partner, or 
an employee of the business who is "under 
a duty" to collect, account for, and pay 
over the tax,4 but that enumeration is not 
exclusive. The capacity designation is 
functional and does not depend on 
formalities of office or title. Directors, 
prospective purchasers, sureties, creditors, 
trustees and other fiduciaries, and 
attorneys all have been held to be 
responsible persons on particular facts. 
One has the capacity requisite for liability 
if one has decision-making power within 
the business, the ability to choose to 
"allocate[ ] funds to other creditors in 
preference to [the tax] obligation."5 
The standard often has been phrased 
imprecisely in the case law, with references 
like "final word" or "full authority."6 This 
has given rise to considerable confusion 
and inconsistency in the decided cases.? 
Whatever the linguistic formulations may 
connote, courts usually hold that "I was 
just following the orders of my boss, who 
told me to pay the other creditors first" is 
not a valid defense. s 
Willfulness: Willfulness is the requisite 
standard under many civil and criminal 
sections, and usually is understood to 
mean "a voluntary, intentional violation 
of a known legal duty."9 Thus, most§ 6672 
decisions describe it as a voluntary and 
intentional, as opposed to a merely 
negligent, failure. However, once again, 
there are many inconsistent formulations 
in the cases and rulings. 
A common situation involves a new 
owner of a business with unpaid trust fund 
taxes. If the new owner, without paying 
the taxes, willfully expends funds that had 
been amassed before her accession to 
control, she can (to that extent) be held 
liable under § 6672 for those prior unpaid 
taxes. However, she cannot be held liable 
for expending funds acquired after she 
assumed control.10 
MULTIPLE LIABLE PERSONS 
As seen above, responsible person is 
defined broadly. As a result, in any 
particular case, there may well be several 
officers, employees, or others who are 
potentially liable under § 6672 for the 
unpaid trust fund taxes of the business. 
This fact has several repercussions. 
First, when a § 6672 case is litigated, 
there often are multiple parties against the 
Government. The IRS is permitted to 
directly assess § 6672 liabilities, but 
assessed persons may seek judicial review 
(typically in federal district court). If one 
assessed party sues the IRS, the 
Government often joins the other persons 
against whom § 6672 assessments for the 
same unpaid taxes have been made.11 The 
Government often is in a comfortable 
position. The mutual finger-pointing 
among the various assessed parties often 
insures that the Government will be 
successful against one or some of them. 
Second, § 6672 liability is joint and 
severat.12 Thus, the IRS may, and often 
does, effect disproportionate collection 
from the various responsible persons. For 
instance, assume $60,000 of unpaid taxes 
and th ree responsible persons. The IRS 
need not limit itself to $20,000 from each. 
Nor need it apportion liabilities among the 
th ree in accord with their respective 
degrees of "fault." Instead, the lRS may 
collect from one, some, or all of the three 
in whatever amounts it can -- including, 
for instance, collecting all $60,000 from 
one and leaving the other two alone. 
In 1996, Congress created a federal 
remedy to alleviate the obviously harsh 
result just described. Section 6672(d) 
creates a federal right to contribution. A 
responsible person against whom the IRS 
has effected disproportionate collection 
may seek contribution from his luckier 
fellows by suing them in federal d istrict 
court. However, so that prompt tax 
collection is not impeded, the 
contribution action must be separate from 
any action involving the IRS in which § 
6672 liability is at issue. 
Finally, although the language of § 
6672(a) refers to a ''penalty," the IRS views 
§ 6672 as a collection device, not as a 
penalty to be imposed on the multiple 
responsible persons on top collected 
taxes.13 Thus, it is the IRS's policy to 
refund amounts collected (and to abate 
amounts assessed but not yet collected) in 
excess of the tax liability. It waits to do so, 
however, until its right to retain enough to 
fully cover the liability has been fixed, 
whether by litigation, binding agreement, 
or expiration of the statute of Limitations 
on refund claims.t4 "' 
[Ed. N ote: Nevada Lawyer regularly 
provides space for a submission from a 
faculty member of the UNLV Boyd School 
of Law. These articles are run without 
editing or censorship. The editorial 
content of Nevada. Lawyer reflects the 
opinions of its authors and does not 
represent or reflect the policies of the 
State Bar of Nevada, the Editor, or the 
Publications Committee.] 
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